Lines Matching refs:byte
499 a byte buffer. It is the inverse of the existing mbedtls_ecp_read_key().
511 attacker could for example impersonate a 4-bytes or 16-byte domain by
541 * Fix a 1-byte buffer overread in mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_der().
929 1 byte too large for the output buffer.
1084 were shifted by one byte, creating an invalid ASN.1 tag. Fixed by
1089 * Fix 1-byte buffer overflow in mbedtls_mpi_write_string() when
1455 input (extensions length field equal to 0), an illegal read of one byte
1568 * Fix the key_app_writer example which was writing a leading zero byte which
1741 function which leads to a potential one byte overread of the message
1863 * Fix a 1-byte heap buffer overflow (read-only) during private key parsing.
2306 * Fix 1 byte buffer overflow in mbedtls_mpi_write_string() when the MPI
2361 * Fix conditional statement that would cause a 1 byte overread in
2374 * Fix potential byte overread when verifying malformed SERVER_HELLO in
2388 * Added support for 3 and 4 byte lengths to mbedtls_asn1_write_len().
2731 length parameter to include the terminating null byte for PEM input.
3187 error if the output buffer was just 1 byte too small.
3944 * Allowed X509 key usage parsing to accept 4 byte values instead of the
3945 standard 1 byte version sometimes used by Microsoft. (Closes ticket #38)
4270 * Updated x509parse_cert_info() to correctly display byte 0 of the